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Abstract
Public-key cryptography in use today can be broken by a quantum computer
with sufficient resources. Microsoft Research has published an open-source library
of quantum-secure supersingular isogeny (SI) algorithms including Diffie-Hellman
key agreement and key encapsulation in portable C and optimized x86 and x64
implementations. For our research, we modified this library to target a deeplyembedded processor with instruction set extensions and a finite-field coprocessor
originally designed to accelerate traditional elliptic curve cryptography (ECC). We
observed a 6.3-7.5x improvement over a portable C implementation using instruction set extensions and a further 6.0-6.1x improvement with the addition of the
coprocessor. Modification of the coprocessor to a wider datapath further increased
performance 2.6-2.9x. Our results show that current traditional ECC implementations can be easily refactored to use supersingular elliptic curve arithmetic and
achieve post-quantum security.
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abelian group

a group that satisfies commutativity

cryptography

the study of techniques for secure communication in the
presence of adversaries

elliptic curve

a smooth, projective, algebraic curve with points that
form an abelian group

field

a set of elements on which addition, subtraction, multiplication, and division are defined

finite field

a field that contains a finite number of elements

group

a set of elements and an operation that satisfies closure,
associativity, identity, and invertiblity

hardware acceleration the use of computer hardware to perform a function more
efficiently than is possible in software
isogeny

a group homomorphism and rational map
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Chapter 1
Introduction

Over the last decade, the convergence of multiple technologies including communications, real-time analytics, and machine learning has evolved the vision of
the Internet of things (IoT). Experts predict that the IoT will consist of nearly
30 billion devices and reach a global market value of $7.1 trillion by 2020 [9].
These devices will have a range of applications such as environmental monitoring, home and building automation, transportation, and medical and healthcare.
Because IoT device data is currently following cryptographic standards and using
encryption in end-to-end scenarios [26], post-quantum cryptography for embedded
devices will be necessary in the years to come.
The last few years have seen a tremendous surge in the study of post-quantum
cryptography. This is mainly due to the ongoing development of quantum computers and their ability to compromise currently used cryptographic protocols. The
problem with current public-key algorithms is that their security relies on one of
three hard mathematical problems: the integer factorization problem [23], the discrete logarithm problem [5], or the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem [19].
Shor’s algorithm can solve the integer factorization problem in polynomial time on
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a quantum computer [25], which is substantially faster than the sub-exponential
runtime of the most efficient known algorithm running on a classical computer
[1]. Furthermore, quantum polynomial time algorithms for solving the hidden
subgroup problem over finite abelian groups have been shown [6] to weaken the
discrete logarithm and elliptic curve discrete logarithm problems.
In 2006, Rostovtsev et al. created a key agreement algorithm that relies on
the difficulty of computing isogenies between ordinary elliptic curves with the
aim of making it quantum-resistant [24]. While the best known classical algorithm for solving this problem requires exponential time [7], its quantum variant
has been shown to recover keys in sub-exponential time [2]. In 2011, De Feo et
al. improved upon the work of Rostovtsev and created what is believed to be a
quantum-resistant key agreement algorithm whose security is based on the hardness of finding isogenies between supersingular elliptic curves [13]. This algorithm
has the advantages that it can be built on top of many of the same primitives already in use for elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman and that it breaks the abelian group
structure, thus making it secure against the quantum attack on the hidden subgroup problem. Currently, there are no known polynomial time algorithms that
can solve this problem and the best known quantum and classical algorithms are
both exponential time [4]. In 2016, Costello et al. of Microsoft Research released
an open-source library1 of SI Diffie-Hellman (SIDH) and key exchange (SIKE)
algorithms.
For our research, we modified this open-source library to target a deeply embedded system with instruction set extensions and a reconfigurable finite-field
coprocessor originally designed to improve the performance of traditional elliptic
curve cryptography (ECC) [28]. It is our intent to showcase how SI algorithms
can be improved using these ECC optimizations. Furthermore, we modify the
1 https://github.com/Microsoft/PQCrypto-SIDH
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pre-existing coprocessor to use a wider datapath and show the performance improvement achieved.
The contributions of this paper are:
• Evaluation and optimization of SI algorithms on a deeply embedded system
across the p503, p751, and p964 primes
• Evaluation of instruction set extensions and a reconfigurable finite-field coprocessor developed for traditional ECC applied to SI algorithms, showing
6.3-7.5x and 38.7-45.3x speedups over portable C code, respectively, with
the highest speedups at larger prime sizes
• Modification of finite-field coprocessor from 32- to 64-bit datapath, showing
additional 2.65-2.95x speedup
• Resource usage of optimized embedded system on 2 different FPGA platforms
• Comparison of optimized embedded system against 32- and 64-bit x86 system, showing comparable performance on a cycle-by-cycle basis

3

Chapter 2
Related Work

In 2016, Costello et al. created an open-source library containing SIDH algorithms
and defined two different primes: p503 and p751. The library is implemented in
portable C as well as hand-tuned x86-64 (x64) assembly. The implementation
is notable because it uses constant-time algorithms for all operations, making it
resistant to timing and cache-timing side channel attacks. Results showed a 3x
speedup compared to other non-constant-time implementations at the time. Furthermore, the finite-field arithmetic routines are algorithmically optimized to take
advantage of common processor architectures - data is accessed sequentially to
improve cache performance, bit-wise operations are used for constant-time operations, and loops are unrolled for improved branch prediction at the cost of code
size. Running on an Intel Haswell processor, the SIDHp751 algorithm was capable
of generating ephemeral public keys in 46 million cycles for Alice and 52 million
cycles for Bob, and shared secret computation took 44 million and 50 million
cycles, respectively [3]. While Costello et al. evaluate SIDH on a desktop/server
grade processor architecture with aggressive out-of-order execution, our work evaluates SIDH on a resource limited embedded architecture with different levels of
hardware acceleration.
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Also in 2016, Koziel et al. investigated the efficiency of implementing SIDH on
an A8 and A15 processor with NEON SIMD extensions. Their studies produced
three new primes: p512, p768, and p1024. They discovered that affine coordinate operations were faster in ARM devices than the Projective coordinates used
by Costello et al. Optimized assembly routines resulted in a 2x speedup over
a portable C implementation and were nearly 3x faster than other ARMv7 implementations using the NEON extensions. Although the A8 and A15 are 32-bit
processors, they still fall into a higher performance category than the processor we
evaluate in this work. For example, the A8 is a dual-issue superscalar architecture,
and the A15 is a dual-issue out-of-order architecture. Furthermore, the NEON extensions fall into the Single Instruction Multiple Data (SIMD) class of data-level
parallelism, whereas we utilize a dedicated accelerator for finite-field arithmetic.
Koziel also presented a constant-time hardware implementation of SIDH synthesized to a Virtex-7 FPGA. Hardware datapaths can be designed to take advantage
of a heavily parallelized workload in Fp2 , which forms the foundation of SI operations. By further replicating these arithmetic logic units, the computation of
large-degree isogenies was improved by 2x over the fastest SIDHp751 implementation at the time. The hardware implementation of SIDHp751 was capable of
generating ephemeral public keys in 10.6 and 11.6 milliseconds and compute the
shared secret key in 9.5 and 10.8 milliseconds for Alice and Bob, respectively
[18, 17]. This implementation is faster than ours in terms of raw performance
at the expense of large area (26-56k flops, 192-470 DSP blocks) and being tied
to a specific field size after synthesis. Our design is lighter weight (4.6-6k flops,
1-17 DSP blocks) and has the benefit of being software-configurable for any of the
proposed SI fields.
In 2017, Jalali et al. performed a rigorous study of different implementations
of SIDH on a 64-bit A57 processor for 125- and 160-bit quantum security levels.
Their optimized assembly routines resulted in a 5x speedup over other portable
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ARMv8 implementations. Though experiments showed using affine coordinates is
more efficient in the final round of SIDH, it was concluded that Projective coordinates showed better overall performance over the entire protocol. Specifically, over
larger finite-fields, Projective formulas show much better performance over affine
formulas [11]. The A57 is a superscalar, out-of-order core targeting the mobile
device market, and although it has SIMD extensions, Jalali et al. found that they
could achieve higher performance multiplication using the normal 64-bit datapath
without utilizing the SIMD extensions.
With the help of Jao in 2017, Costello et al. expanded the library to include
a SIKE algorithm and p964 was defined. At the time of this writing, optimized
implementations for p964 are not included in the library. The SIKE protocol uses
many of the same functions as SIDH and three hash functions instantiated with
the SHA-3 derived function cSHAKE256 [15], and was submitted to NIST as part
of the post-quantum cryptography standardization effort. Running on an Intel
Skylake processor with hand-tuned x64 assembly, the SIKEp751 algorithm was
able to generate an ephemeral public key in 31 million cycles and key encapsulation
and decapsulation took 50 million and 54 million cycles, respectively. In addition
to the software, a SIKE accelerator was written in VHDL and synthesized to a
Virtex-7 FPGA. Results showed a total key encapsulation mechanism (KEM) time
of 33.35 milliseconds. The same SIKE accelerator was synthesized using TSMC 65nm CMOS standard technology and CORE65LPSVT standard cell library. This
implementation resulted in a KEM time of 18.87 milliseconds [12]. While the SIKE
accelerator drastically improved the performance of the algorithm, it is designed
specifically for a single prime. Our implementation strikes a balance between
performance and area by using a small coprocessor to target the routines that
contribute most to computation time.
Later in 2017, Yoo et al. presented the first supersingular elliptic curve isogeny
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digital signature algorithm. They have an open-source library1 containing portable
C code as well as hand-optimized x64 assembly. Interestingly, the library employs
the functions written by Costello et al. for finite-field arithmetic. Running on
an Intel Xeon processor with optimized assembly routines, the digital signature
algorithm using p751 took 123 million cycles to generate an ephemeral public key,
57 billion cycles to sign, and 37 billion cycles to verify. A significant fraction of
the cost incurred by the signing algorithm can be computed offline, in which case
the signing algorithm only needs to compute a hash function [30].

1 https://github.com/yhyoo93/isogenysignature
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Evaluated Microarchitectures

For our work, we chose to evaluate SIDH and SIKE on an ultra-low energy embedded platform, representative of a microarchitecture one might find in an IoT
device. The baseline processor has a 32-bit datapath similar to a PIC32 but has additional Instruction Set Extensions (ISEs) for accelerating traditional ECC. The
fully-accelerated microarchitecture marries the baseline processor with a coprocessor specifically designed for finite-field arithmetic. The RTL for the embedded
platform was obtained from Targhetta et al. [28] who refer to the processor core
as “Pete” and the finite-field arithmetic coprocessor as “Monte.” The following
sections will describe in detail the evaluated microarchitectures, along with the
modifications we made in order to support the larger field sizes found in the SI
algorithms.

8

Chapter 3. Evaluated Microarchitectures

3.1

Embedded Core with Instruction Set Extensions

The microarchitecture of Pete is a traditional 5-stage, in-order, RISC pipeline
with a 32-bit datapath. The integer multiplication unit lies outside of the pipeline
and uses special result registers in addition to the 32 general purpose registers.
Dedicated instructions move data between the result registers and the general purpose registers, allowing multiplication to happen in parallel with other instructions
flowing through the pipeline. This facilitates an energy-efficient, multi-cycle 32x32
multiplication unit that employs a single 16x16 parallel multiplier instead of instantiating a single-cycle, fully parallel multiplier. Even with a tightly nested
multi-precision multiplication loop, the extra latency of multiplication can be hidden with loop maintenance and data movement instructions.
On top of the base processor design, Targhetta et al. extended the multiplication unit to support integer multiply-accumulate, overflow accumulation, addition
direct to the accumulator, and shift accumulator operations. Accumulating instructions take one more cycle than a non-accumulating instruction. These ISEs,
adapted from the work of Groβschädl et al., use the special result registers as an
accumulator and were shown to increase the performance of non-constant time
traditional elliptic curve algorithms by a factor of 1.30 to 1.43 and energy efficiency by a factor of 1.28 to 1.41 [8, 28]. In short, the ISEs allow intermediate
computation to remain within the accumulator, and consequently, improve the
efficiency of multi-precision addition and product-scanning multiplication.
Several instructions tailored to support binary fields — GF (2m ) — are also
part of the architecture but were not used for this work. In keeping with the
theme of targeting a pre-existing design intended for use with traditional ECC,
none of the ISEs were modified, and the binary field-specific instructions were
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Table 3.1: Core ISEs
Format

Operation

Latency (cycles)

maddu rs, rt
m2addu rs, rt
addau rs, rt
sha

{Ov, Hi, Lo} ← {Ov, Hi, Lo} + rs ∗ rt
{Ov, Hi, Lo} ← {Ov, Hi, Lo} + 2 ∗ rs ∗ rt
{Ov, Hi, Lo} ← {Ov, Hi, Lo} + rs + rt
{Ov, Hi, Lo} ← {0, Ov, Hi}

5
5
3
1

not removed from the RTL. In addition to the multi-cycle multiplication unit, a
small 2-bit counter branch predictor is included and functions primarily as a loop
predictor for the tightly nested arithmetic loops present in many cryptographic
algorithms.
The ISEs and their operations are detailed in Table 3.1 with respective latencies. This instruction set extended architecture formed the baseline for our
implementation of the SI algorithms. Table 3.1 does not include the normal suite
of signed and unsigned integer multiplication/division instructions and GF (2m )
extensions that are also present in the core. These ISEs will be used in Algorithms
3, 4, 5, and 9 to accelerate multi-precision and finite-field arithmetic detailed in
Chapter 5.

3.2

Embedded Core with Coprocessor

In addition to the core ISEs, Targhetta et al. also designed a coprocessor tailored for prime finite-field arithmetic. The coprocessor, colloquially referred to as
“Monte,” is depicted in Figure 3.1. The microarchitecture is implemented as a
multi-processing system such that the coprocessor shares memory with the microprocessor, reducing potential performance bottlenecks common amongst bus-style
accelerators. Coprocessor instructions are fetched and partially decoded by Pete
and then forwarded to Monte via the coprocessor interface. Within Monte, copro-
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Figure 3.1: Pete with Monte
The processor core with the prime finite-field coprocessor and shared memory.
W represents the machine width of Monte. Our work evaluates W = 32 and
W = 64.
cessor instructions are queued, enabling Pete to continue with the higher-level computation while Monte works on the lower-level field math. At the center of Monte
is a Finite-Field Arithmetic Unit (FFAU) that computes three multi-precision operations over prime finite-fields: addition, subtraction, and Montgomery multiplication. Operand and result buffers store intermediate field elements and a Direct
Memory Access (DMA) engine allows the transfer of field elements between the
internal buffers and the shared memory. To allow the overlap of data movement
with computation, Monte uses a double buffering scheme for both operands and
results.
The coprocessor instructions and their operations are detailed in Table 3.2.
Monte follows the simple load-store model in which computation takes place on
field elements within the buffers, and separate instructions for loading and storing field elements to and from memory are provided. The first three instructions in Table 3.2 handle the loading of input operands and the prime into the
operand buffers. The next three instructions are the computation instructions,
and the Store is for storing the result back into memory. Algorithm 1 illustrates
the assembly routine that coordinates finite-field addition using the coprocessor.
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Format

Table 3.2: Monte Instructions
Description
Operation

cop2lda rt
cop2ldb rt
cop2ldn rt
cop2mul
cop2add
cop2sub
cop2st rt
cop2sync
ctc2 rt,rd

Load A into operand buffer
Load B into operand buffer
Load N into operand buffer
Modular multiplication
Modular addition
Modular subtraction
Store result to memory
Coprocessor 2 Sync
Move to control register

OpBuff[A] ← Mem[GPR[rt]]
OpBuff[B] ← Mem[GPR[rt]]
OpBuff[N] ← Mem[GPR[rt]]
ResultBuff ← A ∗ B mod N
ResultBuff ← A + B mod N
ResultBuff ← A − B mod N
Mem[GPR[rt]] ← ResultBuff
Stall until Monte is idle
cop2CR[rd] ← GPR[rt]

Figure 3.2: The Finite-Field Arithmetic Unit of Monte
Our work evaluates W = 32 and W = 64.
Subtraction and multiplication assembly routines are similar. There is no implicit synchronization between the microprocessor and the coprocessor; all data
synchronization is performed through a cop2sync instruction that stalls the microprocessor until the coprocessor is idle. The coprocessor is configured at runtime
with constants needed for Montgomery domain computation and with constants
that set the correct field size for multi-precision computation. The last instruction
in Table 3.2 is used for this configuration.
Figure 3.2 provides a zoomed in view of the FFAU, which is the primary
datapath within Monte. Notable features include a 32-bit multiply-add unit, buffer
address generation logic, and a microcoded control unit. The multiply-add unit
is a 3-stage pipelined arithmetic unit that in multiplication mode performs the
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following computation: Result = OpA ∗ OpB + OpC + Carry, such that carry
is the upper 32-bit result from the previous operation. Note that the throughput
of the multiply-add unit is one operation per cycle, meaning a multiply-add can
start on every clock cycle but takes 3 clock cycles to complete. This type of
design lends itself nicely to multi-precision multiplication. In addition mode, the
multiply-add unit performs the following computation: Result = OpA + OpB +
OpC + Carry. The address generation logic blocks are simple, dedicated units
for loop maintenance within the tightly nested multi-precision computations. The
microcoded control unit orchestrates the arithmetic unit and address generation
logic to carry out the Coarsely Integrated Operand Scanning (CIOS) Montgomery
multiplication algorithm [16] in addition to modular addition and subtraction. It
should be noted that Monte’s datapath and control unit were specifically optimized
for the CIOS algorithm because modular multiplication is the primary operation to
optimize for any cryptographic scheme based on elliptic curves. This has to do with
the number of invocations of multiplications of O(n2 ) complexity, as compared to
O(n) for addition and subtraction.
Algorithm 1 Field Addition using Monte, c = a + b mod n
Input:a, b ∈ Fp , n = Fp
cop2ldA a
. load A operand buffer from pointer a using DMA
cop2ldB b
. load B operand buffer from pointer b using DMA
cop2ldN n . In practice, ldN is omitted here; n is pre-loaded at initialization
cop2add
cop2stC c
. store result from buffer to pointer c using DMA

Crucially, all Monte operations are constant-time by virtue of the way they
are implemented in microcode. Algorithm 2 is a pseudocode representation of the
internals of the coprocessor as it processes a cop2add instruction. This algorithm
is constant-time because it unconditionally processes the prime value subtraction
and only selects a buffer that contains the correct result. Previous work did not
construct higher-level constant time algorithms that used Monte, but this work
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does as detailed in Chapter 5.
Algorithm 2 Constant-Time Modular Addition Using Monte
Input:a, b ∈ Fp , n = Fp
x←a+b
. Add operands into the first
0
{borrow, x } ← x − n
. Subtract the modulus into the second
if borrow then
. a + b < n, select the first
c←x
else
. a + b ≥ n, select the second
0
c←x
end if

buffer
buffer
buffer
buffer

For our research, the architecture of Monte was only initially modified to increase the size of the operand buffers to a suitable size for the p964 extension field.
The change needed to enable this functionality was sizing the operand buffers such
that they were ≥ 384 bytes in size - enough to hold a, b, and n operands up to
1024 bits in size. Note that the previous work using Monte only sized operand
buffers for up to a 521-bit field, the largest prime field standardized by NIST for
traditional elliptic curve cryptography [22]. In subsequent work, we increased the
datapath width to 64 bits wide to further accelerate the larger field sizes required
for the SI algorithms. The modifications required for the 64-bit datapath were
minimal. The FFAU core, the coprocessor top level buses, and the configuration
registers were extended to 64 bits. We did not modify any microcode or control
logic.
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Underlying Mathematics

In this chapter we first give a brief description of the underlying operations used
in SI algorithms. Next we will “zoom in” and discuss some of the optimizations
that can be made to the algorithms. We will then provide a high-level description
of the SIDH and SIKE protocols. Our contributions to the finite-field arithmetic
implementation are discussed in Chapter 5, but here we provide the context for
their use in the class of SI algorithms.

4.1

Overview of SI Operations

For traditional ECC, the primary computational burden is scalar point multiplication over a single elliptic curve, while for SIDH and SIKE the primary computation
is a large-degree isogeny from one supersingular elliptic curve to another. Figure
4.1 illustrates the computational hierarchy of the protocols, showing that largedegree isogenies are computed using many small-degree isogeny evaluations along
with scalar point multiplications. Finally, scalar point multiplications and smalldegree isogenies are evaluated using finite-field arithmetic. The primary takeaway
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Figure 4.1: Supersingular Elliptic Curve Isogeny Algorithm Computational Hierarchy

here is that, like traditional ECC, SIDH and SIKE are built on top of finite-field
arithmetic. Our measurements in Table 7.3 show that, even for highly accelerated architectures, 89-94% of the key generation computation time is spent in
finite-field arithmetic routines. Thus, we can apply many of the same hardware
acceleration techniques used for traditional ECC to SIDH and SIKE. The question
our research attempts to answer is: “how well do these techniques carry over?”
The implementation operates over finite-field Fp2 with a characteristic of the
form p = `eAA `eBB f ± 1, where `A and `B are small primes and f is a cofactor such
that p is prime. A Montgomery curve Ea,b /Fp2 is a special form of an elliptic curve
and is defined to be the set of points P = (x, y) of solutions in Fp2 to the equation
by 2 = x3 + ax2 + x, as well as the point at infinity ∞. An isogeny φ : E1 → E2 is
a group homomorphism from E1 to E2 , and isogenies of Montgomery curves can
be efficiently computed using elliptic curve point arithmetic. The j-invariant of
the Montgomery curve defined by the implementation is computed as j(Ea,b ) =
256(a2 −3)3
a2 −4

[3, 12, 13].

The computational burden of the SIDH and SIKE protocols is in the Montgomery ladder and large-degree isogeny calculations. Let {P, Q} be two points
in Ea,b and {m, n} be two random integers both less than `e . The SI protocols
require computation of a random point mP + nQ in the kernel of the isogenies.
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This is equivalent to P + (m−1 n)Q, which can be efficiently computed using the
double-and-add technique. The downside to using this standard technique is that
it is vulnerable to simple power analysis (SPA) and is non-constant time. To avoid
SPA and timing side channels, the significantly slower Montgomery ladder is used
to compute the point. De Feo et al. optimized the Montgomery ladder routine to
take advantage of the fact that, on each iteration, the values xQ, (x + 1)Q, and
P + xQ are stored for x equal to the leftmost bits of m−1 n. By using differential
addition of points on a Montgomery curve, the ladder can be made comparable in
efficiency to double-and-add on twisted Edwards curves. Costello et al. implement
LADDER3P T : (x(P ), x(Q), x(Q − P ), a, m) → x(P + mQ) as specified by De
Feo [13, 3].
The SI protocols also require calculation of φ : E0 → En , where φ = φn−1 ◦· · ·◦
φ0 is a large-degree isogeny composed of a chain of n isogenies. Let φi : Ei → Ei+1 ,
then Ei+1 and the isogeny φi can be computed using Vélu’s formulas [21]. De Feo
et al. provide a detailed description of the computational structure of the largedegree isogeny and define a well-formed strategy to reduce the number of scalarpoint multiplications and isogeny evaluations needed. Costello et al. generalized
this further with a MAGMA1 script that computes the optimal strategy given the
weights of computing a scalar point multiplication versus evaluating an isogeny
[13, 3].

4.2

SI Diffie-Hellman (SIDH)

The protocol fixes Montgomery curve E0 /Fp2 : y 2 = x3 + x and bases {PA , QA }
and {PB , QB } as public parameters. To compute her public key, Alice chooses two
secret integers mA , nA < `eAA and computes RA using the LADDER3P T function.
1 http://magma.maths.usyd.edu.au/magma/
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Her secret key is computed as φA : E0 → EA with kernel RA , and her public key is
EA together with the image points {φA (PB ), φA (QB )}. Bob goes through the same
process with the A and B subscripts swapped. Alice and Bob must send two sets
of information to ensure non-commutative isogenies. This property makes SIDH
different from other Diffie-Hellman-like key agreement protocols, but this property
is what breaks the abelian group structure. To compute the shared secret, Alice
uses her secret integers and Bob’s public key to compute φ0A : EB → EBA whose
kernel is the point φB (RA ). Bob computes EAB in the same way. Because EAB and
EBA are isomorphic, Alice and Bob can compute a shared secret as the common
j-invariant j(EAB ) = j(EBA ) [3].

4.3

SI Key Encapsulation (SIKE)

SIKE allows Alice to encrypt a secret key before sending to Bob. The SIKE
protocol uses the same public parameters used in SIDH for elliptic curve and
isogeny calculations. The protocol also fixes n ∈ {192, 256, 320} to represent the
length of random bitstrings and hash outputs. Let G be a function that hashes
a random bit string m ∈ M = {0, 1}n concatenated with a public key pk. The
function F is used as a key derivation function (KDF) on the j-invariant. H is
used to derive the k-bit shared key K from a random bit string m and ciphertext
c. All three hash functions are instantiated with the NIST-specified function
cSHAKE256 [12, 15].
Here we’ll focus on the public-key encryption (PKE) scheme used by the protocol, which uses the operations already established for SIDH. First, let’s assume
that Alice and Bob have each already generated a public-private key pair offline.
Alice will compute the common j-invariant using Bob’s public key and her own private key. Alice can now encrypt message m and produce ciphertext c1 = F (j)⊕m.
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Alice sends the pair (c0 , c1 ) to Bob, where c0 represents Alice’s public key. Bob
is able to decrypt the ciphertext and retrieve the message m = c1 ⊕ F (j) after
computing the j-invariant [12].
The key encapsulation mechanism (KEM) can be built by applying a transformation to the PKE. Once again, we will assume that both Alice and Bob have each
generated ephemeral keys. Alice will now choose a value for m and generate the
(c0 , c1 ) pair to send to Bob as she did using PKE. However, rather than deriving
c0 from her private key, Alice will derive it from the random value G(m||pk). The
shared secret can be computed using H(m||(c0 , c1 )). Upon receipt of (c0 , c1 ), Bob
can decrypt the message in the same manner as PKE to retrieve m0 . Assuming
there are no errors, Bob can compute the same shared secret using H(m0 ||(c0 , c1 )).
With the shared secret, Bob can decrypt any messages Alice may have sent [12].
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Implementation and
Optimizations

Because SIDH and SIKE are composed of elliptic curve and isogeny operations
built on top of finite-field arithmetic, the use of ISEs and a finite-field coprocessor
should naturally improve the performance of the protocols. In this chapter, we
give an overview of the algorithmic optimizations incorporated in the SI library,
then describe how we modified the library to use instruction set extensions and
the coprocessor.

5.1

Algorithm Optimizations

Costello et al. wrote the library to use fast constant-time algorithms for elliptic
curve operations. Constant time in this context means that the execution time of
an algorithm is not dependent on the input. Therefore, no secret information is
leaked under a timing or cache-timing attack.
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One design decision that led to improved performance was in the selection of
the finite-field characteristic. For efficient isogeny calculations, the parameters
`A = 2, `B = 3, f = 1 were used by the implementation. The parameters eA , eB
were carefully chosen such that the difference between Alice and Bob’s order was
minimized (2eA ≈ 3eB ) in order to balance the computational cost of the protocols.
This proved to be convenient for the 4-isogeny calculations because

eA
2

≈ eB . Ad-

ditionally, for p503, p751, and p964, the bit length is slightly less than a multiple of
64 which causes there to be a number of zero bits at the top of the most significant
word. In order to improve the performance of the constant-time implementation,
an additional bit of the most significant word is used to allow intermediate results in the range [0, 2p). A constant-time modular correction routine is used to
move a Fp term into the range [0, p). The primes chosen have a form that facilitates fast modular reduction. The Montgomery reduction [20] residue for an
input a < pR can be computed using c =

(a+p(ap0 mod R))
R

for Montgomery con-

stants R and p0 = −p−1 mod R. The special primes result in p0 − 1 containing
approximately

n
2

zero words in the lower half, where n is the length of the prime

in words. These zero words cut the number of multiplications in the reduction
algorithm in half. A Comba-based algorithm that separates the multiplication
from the modular reduction was used, which allowed the multiplication routine
to be implemented using Karatsuba. All these optimizations drastically improve
the performance of the modular multiplication which, as seen in Table 7.3, is the
largest bottleneck in elliptic curve arithmetic. In the case of p751, the modular
reduction showed a speedup of 1.85x when applying these optimizations to the
algorithm [3].
In traditional ECC, a widely-used technique involves avoiding inversions by
working in Projective space (X : Y : Z). The implementation uses these same
optimizations, but also works projectively with curve coefficients. Ea,b can also be
written as EA:B:C : By 2 = Cx3 + Ax2 + Cx such that a =
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invariant can then be computed as j(EA:B:C ) =

256(A2 −3C 2 )3
,
C 4 (A2 −4C 2 )

which does not depend

on the B coefficient. Using projective space in conjunction with Montgomery
curves leads to efficient point arithmetic that allows computation dependent only
on (X : Z), and new isogeny arithmetic that depends only on (A : C). Using these
optimizations, only one inversion is required when generating ephemeral public
keys or computing the shared secret. Field inversions can be easily implemented
using the binary GCD algorithm, which is not constant-time. Alternatively, by
capitalizing on Fermat’s little theorem and exponentiation by squaring, a constanttime inversion can be performed. This method is approximately 9x slower than
using binary GCD, but was reported to have less than a 1% impact on the overall
latency of SIDH [3].
Other optimizations to the elliptic curve and isogeny algorithms include an
efficient Montgomery point tripling function used in the construction of largedegree isogenies, a 4-isogeny function that was found to be faster than computing
a pair of 2-isogenies, and the use of base-field and trace-zero subgroups reduce
the size of the public parameters. The implementation strikes a balance between
efficiency and simplicity of design [3]. Our research leverages the implementation
of these high level routines when executing the protocol. Next, we discuss our
contributions to the finite-field arithmetic.

5.2

ISE Optimizations

Multi-precision integers are represented as an array of unsigned integers. Each
integer is the size of a processor word (32 bits on Pete), and multi-precision integer
routines operate on these word-sized data. Using the extended instruction set, we
were able to perform multi-precision integer addition and subtraction in fewer
data movement operations with the addau instruction (see Table 3.1). Algorithm
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3 shows the multi-precision addition function specific to Pete using a pseudocode
representation.
Algorithm 3 Multi-precision Addition
procedure MpAdd(a,b,c,n) . c = a + b, where n is the array length in words.
ACC ← 0
. Clear the accumulator.
for i in 0 to n − 1 do
ACC ← ACC + ai + bi
. Using the addau instruction.
ci ← ACCLO
. Move data out of the accumulator into c.
Shift ACC
. Using the sha instruction.
end for
return ACCLO
. Carry out bit (0 or 1).
end procedure

Though ISEs do not make provisions for a subtract accumulator instruction, we
can still accelerate subtraction and reduce the number of data movement instructions by using the addau instruction. By taking advantage of two’s complement
representation for negative integers, we can compute a − b = a + (−b). Algorithm
4 shows the multi-precision subtraction function specific to Pete. This function
is constant-time as the if-else statement can be implemented as a bit-wise XOR
operation.
Algorithm 4 Multi-precision Subtraction
procedure MpSub(a,b,c,n) . c = a − b, where n is the array length in words.
ACC ← 1
. Load the accumulator with 1.
for i in 0 to n − 1 do
ACC ← ACC + ai + bC
. bC
i
i denotes the one’s complement of bi .
ci ← ACCLO
. Move data out of the accumulator into c.
Shift ACC
. Using the sha instruction.
end for
if ACCLO = 1 then
return 0
else
return 1
end if
. If-else statement can be implemented with bit-wise XOR.
end procedure
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Multi-precision multiplication is not as straightforward, with a larger trade
space of potentially optimal algorithms. The optimized x64 implementation of
SIDH written by Costello et al. uses the Karatsuba method for fast multi-precision
multiplication in software, but this proved to be inefficient in a constant-time
implementation using our hardware. Karatsuba trades one multi-precision multiply of quadratic complexity for additional additions and subtractions of linear
complexity. Using our hardware and the maddu instruction, the multi-precision
multiplications required by Karatsuba could be performed quickly. However, the
instructions needed to move the data into and out of the accumulator created a
“hiccup” in the dataflow of the algorithm. Instead, we settled on using a product
scanning algorithm [10] that allowed us to keep the result stored in the accumulator. This led to fewer data movement operations, allowed us to write tight loops
efficiently, and showed improved performance over Karatsuba. Algorithm 5 shows
what the multi-precision multiplication algorithm looks like targeted for Pete.
Algorithm 5 Multi-precision Multiplication
1: procedure MpMul(a,b,c,n) . c = ab, where n is the array length in words.
2:
ACC ← 0
. Clear the accumulator.
3:
for i in 0 to n − 1 do
. Lower words of result.
4:
for j in 0 to i do
5:
ACC ← ACC + aj bi−j
. Using the maddu instruction.
6:
ci ← ACCLO
. Move data out of accumulator into c.
7:
Shift ACC
. Using the sha instruction.
8:
end for
9:
end for
10:
for i in n to 2n − 2 do
. Upper words of result.
11:
for j in i − n + 1 to n − 1 do
12:
ACC ← ACC + aj bi−j
13:
ci ← ACCLO
14:
Shift ACC
15:
end for
16:
end for
17:
c2n−1 ← ACCLO
. Store most significant word of result.
18: end procedure
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For multi-precision squaring, the original library code simply called the MpMul
routine with the input duplicated. Unfortunately, this method misses out on
a slight optimization. Looking at Algorithm 5, if b = a then it follows that
ai bj + aj bi = ai aj + aj ai = 2ai aj . By using the m2addu instruction, we can
eliminate half of the multiplication instructions. Algorithm 9 shows the squaring
algorithm using the m2addu instruction on Pete.
Up to now we have not discussed the latencies associated with the extended
instructions. For example, the maddu instruction requires five clock cycles to complete. However, because the accumulator and the arithmetic units that act on it
lie parallel to the processor’s regular datapath, instructions that do not use the
accumulator can be overlapped. Therefore, the latency of multi-cycle accumulator
instructions can be hidden behind the pointer increments and memory reads that
prepare the next accumulator operation. This leads to efficient algorithms that
reduce the number of data movement instructions. Algorithm 6 “zooms in” on the
first loop of the MpMul routine (lines 3-9) and shows the interleaving of instructions. The body of the innermost loop contains one accumulator instruction (line
10) that is allowed to execute in parallel with the other instructions. The processor will not stall during execution of this loop. However, once the termination
condition of this loop is met, the processor will continue to the mflo instruction
(line 14) and must stall until the result is ready. In this case, the processor must
stall for only one clock cycle.
Finite field operations can now be built using the multi-precision functions.
Constant-time field addition involves three passes through the operands. The first
pass performs the multi-precision addition, the second pass subtracts the modulus
value, and the final pass performs a constant-time conditional add of either the
modulus value or zero to ensure that the result is in [0, p). Algorithm 7 shows
the constant-time field addition using Pete. This algorithm is still constant-time
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Algorithm 6 Multi-precision Multiplication in Assembly
1: loop1:
. For i in 0 to n − 1 do
2:
addu $t0,$a1,$0
. t0 ← address of a0
3:
addu $t1,$a2,$t4
. t1 ← address of bi
4:
addu $t9,$a1,$t4
5:
addiu $t9,$t9,4
. t9 ← loop termination value
6:
loop2:
. For j in 0 to i do
7:
lw $t5,0($t0)
. t5 ← aj
8:
lw $t6,0($t1)
. t6 ← bi−j
9:
addiu $t0,$t0,4
. Increment a pointer.
10:
maddu $t5,$t6
. ACC ← ACC + aj bi−j (5 cycles remaining)
11:
addiu $t1,$t1,-4
. Decrement b pointer (4 cycles remaining)
12:
bne $t0,$t9,loop2
. If j 6= i go to loop2, otherwise continue (3 cycles
remaining)
13:
addu $t2,$a0,$t4
. t2 ← address of ci (2 cycles remaining)
14:
mflo $t1
. t1 ← ACCLO (stall for 1 cycle)
15:
sha
. Shift ACC
16:
addiu $t4,$t4,4
. Increment i
17:
sw $t1,0($t2)
. ci ← ACCLO
18:
bne $t4,$v1,loop1
. If i 6= n − 1 go to loop1, otherwise continue

despite the if-else statement as the conditional add can be achieved using the
bit-wise AND operator.
All the finite-field functions are implemented using the multi-precision functions. By improving the performance of the multi-precision functions with the
Algorithm 7 Fp Addition
procedure FpAdd(a,b,c)
. c = a + b mod p, where p is intrinsic to the
protocol.
M pAdd(a, b, c, Np )
. Np is the length of p in words.
mask = 0 − M pSub(c, p, c, Np )
. Subtract the prime.
if mask = 0 then
M pAdd(c, 0, c, Np )
else
M pAdd(c, p, c, Np )
end if
. Conditional addition of p.
end procedure
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extended instruction set, the improvements will propagate up into the higher-level
routines.

5.3

Coprocessor Optimizations

Using Monte, the field additions, subtractions, and multiplications are all constanttime by design of the coprocessor’s microcode and datapath. The double buffering scheme allows execution of modular arithmetic while simultaneously queuing
operands for the next operation. The prime that defines the finite-field remains
static throughout the protocol, so the Montgomery constant used by Monte and
the prime only need to be loaded at initialization time. This leads to a slight
improvement compared to reloading the prime in each of the software routines.
Because Monte performs modular multiplication using the CIOS algorithm, the
reduction is interleaved with the multiplication. This eliminates the need for a
software modular reduction routine. Additionally, Monte always outputs values
in the range [0, p), so there is no longer a need to call the correction routine.
This drastically improves the performance of the protocol as every aspect of the
finite-field arithmetic is improved. Algorithm 1 shows an example of what the
field math looks like using Monte.
Monte is not capable of natively computing modular division or inversion. Instead, inversion is calculated via Fermat’s little theorem using Monte to accelerate
modular exponentiation. Division can be calculated via inversion and multiplication:

x
y

= xy −1 . However, the library eliminates as much modular division in

the algorithm as possible, and a fast FpDiv2 is used by the protocols. Using this
algorithm, division can be computed without the need for inversion. Algorithm 8
shows how the division-by-2 algorithm operates.
The algorithm performs finite-field division by 4 by chaining two calls to the
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Algorithm 8 Divide by 2 ∈ Fp
procedure FpDiv2(a,c)
if a0 is odd then
M pAdd(a, p, c, Np )
else
M pAdd(a, 0, c, Np )
end if
M pShif tR1(c, Np )
end procedure

.c=

a
2

mod p

. Np is the length of p in words.

. Conditional addition of p.
. Multi-precision shift-right-by-1 (divide-by-2).

FpDiv2 function back-to-back. Though the use of Monte renders instruction set
extensions in the multi-precision functions moot, the MpAdd function used in
FpDiv2 can still be improved. The MpShiftR1 function is trivial to implement
and it does not use ISEs. Using Monte, the performance improvement of using
ISEs becomes a small percentage of the overall improvement. However, because
the multi-precision functions are still required by the underlying operations, the
ISEs can still improve performance.
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In this chapter we will describe the build process used to collect data for two different implementations provided by the open-source library. One implementation
is portable C compiled into x86 assembly. The other implementation is mixed
C/assembly that is compiled into x64 assembly.
The library comes with a build script that makes compiling for the different
architectures simple. Table 6.1 details the command used to build for the two
provided architectures. We used gcc version 4.4.7 to compile the open-source
library targets. The x86 target compiles portable C code into 32-bit instructions.
The x64 target compiles mixed C/assembly into 64-bit assembly with optimized
routines for the finite-field math. At the time of writing, we did not have a
processor capable of executing the Intel adx (multi-precision add-carry) and mulx
(unsigned multiply without affecting condition codes) instructions. Because these
instructions were new at the time of writing the library, the code allows their use
to be disabled. As a result, our reported numbers for the assembly-optimized x64
will be slower than previous publications. The timing data for x86 and x64 was
gathered on an Intel Xeon 2.9GHz processor with 64GB RAM, 32KB L1D/L1I
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Architecture

Table 6.1: GNU Make Options for x86/x64
Build Command

x86

make CC=gcc ARCH=x86 OPT LEVEL=GENERIC
OPT=-O3 SET=EXTENDED

x64

make CC=gcc ARCH=x64 OPT LEVEL=FAST
OPT=-O3
SET=EXTENDED
USE ADX=FALSE
USE MULX=FALSE

cache, 256KB L2 cache, and 2MB L3 cache.
Code for Pete is built using a custom toolchain compiled using crosstools-ng
version 1.22. The Pete compiler is gcc version 5.2.0 and customized to recognize
the extended instruction set. The Pete timing data was gathered on the Pete microprocessor synthesized to a Zedboard FPGA and represents the portable C code
compiled with our custom toolchain; this served as the baseline to compare our
future improvements against. PeteISE denotes the build for which the finite-field
and multi-precision arithmetic is optimized with the ISEs described in Table 3.1.
PeteMonte32 denotes the build that uses both ISEs and Monte with an unaltered,
32-bit datapath. PeteMonte64 denotes the build that uses both ISEs and Monte
with datapath modifications from 32- to 64-bit.
The cycle counts reported in Chapter 7 were collected by running the tests
contained in the library. The tests are provided to benchmark the various operations used in the algorithms and check the correctness of the implementations. For
the finite-field and elliptic curve and isogeny benchmarks, the x86 and x64 builds
perform 100,000 bench loops and 100 test loops. For each of the Pete builds we
used 100 bench loops and test loops. Because Pete does not have a data cache, we
saw only small variations between the execution times when looping and decided
that 100 loops was enough to filter out the noise. With 100 test loops, we are able
to show the same level of fidelity as the provided implementations.
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In this chapter, we benchmark the implementations over the finite-field arithmetic
functions, elliptic curve and isogeny functions, and finally the SIDH and SIKE
protocols. By showing the benchmark times for p503, p751, and p964, we hope to
showcase the following:

• hardware built to accelerate traditional ECC at the finite-field level can be
easily adapted to accelerate SIDH and SIKE
• well-designed ISEs can accelerate software-only SI implementations with
high payoff for minimal logic
• with a reconfigurable coprocessor, an embedded system can perform competitively with high-end processors
• higher levels of acceleration have a lower scaling factor for larger field sizes
compared to unaccelerated architectures; increasing the security factor on a
system with acceleration has a lower performance penalty than on a nonaccelerated system
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7.1

Fp and Fp2 Arithmetic Evaluation

Table 7.1 shows the timing measurements for the p751 finite-field algorithms.
Primes p503 and p964 are omitted for brevity but are included in Table A.1 in
the Appendix. The Pete column represents a portable C implementation compiled for the Pete processor. The PeteISE column represents a mixed C/assembly
implementation that uses the ISEs for multi-precision and finite-field operations.
Finally, the PeteMonte32 and PeteMonte64 columns represent mixed C/assembly implementations that coordinate finite-field operations with the coprocessor with a
32- and 64-bit datapath, respectively.
As with ECC, multiplication and squaring are the most significant operations
in the SI algorithms due to their higher computational complexities, e.g. O(n2 )
as opposed to O(n) for addition and subtraction. As seen in Table 7.1, the multiplication time for the baseline Pete implementation is nearly 3x slower than that
of the x86 build, but the PeteISE multiplication is over 2x and 7x faster than the
x86 and baseline Pete builds, respectively. For Monte, the 32-bit variant is a little
over 2x slower than the optimized x86 64-bit build (x64), but the 64-bit variant
is 1.64x faster than the x64 build. For squaring, only the PeteISE architecture
takes advantage of a separate squaring algorithm facilitated by the accumulator
in conjunction with the m2addu instruction shown in Table 3.1. In such case, we
see up to a 12% reduction over multiplication for p751.
When looking at the extension field level, we see that x64 closes the performance gap, i.e. PeteMonte64 GF (p7512 ) multiplication is only 1.2x faster than that
of x64. The reason for this is that PeteMonte64 does not take advantage of some
mathematical optimizations, such as lazy reduction, at the extension field level.
Instead, the design of the accelerator slightly favors simplicity over efficiency and
reduces the results mod p for every field math operation. This fact also contributes
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Op

x86

Table 7.1: Field Math Cycle Count
x64
Pete
PeteISE

PM32

PM64

p751
Fp Add
Fp Sub
Fp Mul
Fp Sqr
Fp Red
Fp Inv
Fp2 Add
Fp2 Sub
Fp2 Mul
Fp2 Sqr
Fp2 Inv

591
63
1,413
952
79
378
52
977
653
79
23,102
667
75,650
10,164
1,378
†
†
†
9,075
†
9,533
268
30,320
5,295
5,317
20,788,481 591,978 67,989,937 8,328,377 1,262,795
1,179
117
2,816
1,904
158
781
96
1,944
1,308
158
61,496
1,831
198,316
25,610
4,649
47,065
1,409
153,107
21,594
3,080
20,870,580 594,527 68,294,317 8,368,154 1,268,626
† Optimized implementation unavailable

43
43
406
†
5,319
378,107
86
86
1,517
1,004
379,918

to the smaller buffer sizes within Monte.

7.2

Elliptic Curve Arithmetic Evaluation

Table 7.2 shows the timing measurements for elliptic curve operations over the
GF (p7512 ) field across the differing architectures. Primes p503 and p964 are
omitted for brevity but are included in Table A.2 in the Appendix.

Op

Table 7.2: EC Operation Cycle Count
x86
x64
Pete
PeteISE PM32

PM64

p751
2P
3P
get3isog(P )
eval3isog(P )
get4isog(P )
eval4isog(P )

344,280
675,372
281,556
344,389
193,859
470,043

10,615
20,669
9,497
10,609
6,203
14,615

1,108,823
2,175,303
895,004
1,108,810
625,422
1,510,109
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152,076
302,112
142,788
152,060
95,316
206,492

25,361
49,431
20,899
25,376
13,096
34,962

8,417
16,479
7,375
8,420
4,456
11,610
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7.3

SIDH Evaluation

Figure 7.1 illustrates the clock cycle measurements of the entire SIDH protocol
over each of the primes for the various architectures we evaluated. Further details
of the exact clock cycle timings for each protocol component are included in Table
A.3 in the appendix. It should be noted that we did not include results for p964 on
the x64 target because assembly optimized routines for p964 do not yet exist. Pete
(without ISEs) took 4x the clock cycles of an x86 processor, and nearly 100x that
of an x64 over each of the primes. By redesigning the finite-field operations to use
the ISEs, we saw a speedup of approximately 6x over the portable implementation.
PeteISE showed better performance than that of the x86 build representative of a
32-bit desktop processor.
With the addition of Monte we saw another 7x improvement over that of
PeteISE . This is approximately a 42x speedup over the portable implementation.
Though Monte renders modifications to the field math routines moot, the ISEs
still improved the multi-precision integer routines. After modifying Monte to have
a 64-bit datapath we saw another 2.97-3.17x speedup over the 32-bit datapath.
Close examination of Figure 7.1 shows that the Pete and Monte architectures
45000

Clock Cycles * 106

35000
30000

900
800

B Share
B Key Gen
A Share
A Key Gen

700

Clock Cycles * 106

40000

25000
20000
15000

500
400
300
200

10000

100

5000
0

600

B Share
B Key Gen
A Share
A Key Gen

0

x8
6

Pe

te

p503

Pe
te

ISE

x8
6

Pe
te
p751

Pe
te

ISE

x8
6

Pe

te

p964

Pe

teI

SE

x6
4

PM
P
32 M64
p503

x6

4

PM
P
32 M64
p751

PM
P
32 M64
p964

Figure 7.1: Millions of Clock Cycles vs. Field Size of SIDH Algorithms
x86, Pete running portable C, and Pete with ISEs running assembly optimized
code (left) and x64, Pete with Monte32, and Pete with Monte64 (right). Note x64
assembly optimized code for p964 does not exist and was omitted.
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Table 7.3: CPU Time of Finite-Field Arithmetic for Alice’s SIDH Key Generation
on PeteMonte64
GF (p) Operation
p503
p751
p964
Addition
Subtraction
Multiplication

12.7%
8.82%
68.06%

10.13%
7.04%
75.65%

8.35%
5.8%
80.49%

Total

89.58%

92.82%

94.64%

scale out to larger key sizes better than the baseline Pete and even slightly better
than Pete with ISEs. In fact, Monte64 scaling is on par with the optimized x64
implementation going from p503 to p751. We expect similar results when we
evaluate p964 on the optimized x64 platform. In order to view the clock cycle
times for p503, p751, and p964 on all platforms, Figure 7.2 plots the results using
a logarithm scale. This demonstrates the significant levels of acceleration provided
by Monte32 and Monte64.
Table 7.3 shows the percentage of time spent in the field math for the implementation accelerated with Monte64. As shown, even the accelerated field math is
taking up a significant portion of the computation time, which indicates, according
to Amdahl’s Law, that this architecture could possibly benefit from even greater
hardware acceleration. We also see an expected trend of a higher percentage of
field math computation with larger field sizes.
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Figure 7.2: Millions of Clock Cycles vs. Field Size in Log Scale Across Architectures
Note x64 assembly optimized code for p964 does not exist and was omitted.

7.4

SIKE Evaluation

Figure 7.3 illustrates the clock cycle measurements of the SIKE algorithms over
each of the primes for the different architectures. Refer to Table A.4 in the appendix for a full list of our experimental results for SIKE. The improvement factors
for each of the Pete iterations are approximately the same as those observed in
the SIDH protocol. However, of notable importance is the fact that x64 is only
slightly slower than Monte64. In the case of SIKE, the SHA-3 computations are
not accelerated or optimized for Pete, allowing the higher performance x64 to
further close the performance gap.
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Figure 7.3: Millions of Clock Cycles vs. Field Size of SIKE Algorithms
x86, Pete running portable C, and Pete with ISEs running assembly optimized
code (left) and x64, Pete with Monte32, and Pete with Monte64 (right). Note x64
assembly optimized code for p964 does not exist and was omitted.

7.5

Code Size

Table 7.4 shows the compiled code size of the SIDH and SIKE libraries. The sizes
reported are those of PeteISE . In each case, PeteMonte32 and PeteMonte64 reduce the
sizes by approximately 1kB. The code size of p964 is smaller than that of p751
because of the unoptimized inversion routine used in the case of p964. Rather
than performing aggressive loop unrolling, a small loop is used to perform the
exponentiation by squaring. The main difference between the SIDH and SIKE
libraries is in the cSHAKE256 hash function, which is approximately 11kB in size.

Table 7.4: SI Library Code Size (kB)
Library p503 p751 p964
SIDH
SIKE

20
32

22
34

37

20
33
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7.6

FPGA Implementation

Pete and Monte are designed to be synthesizable to a number of targets. Table 7.5
shows the resources consumed by the various studied architectures on two different
Xilinx parts. Of particular note are the DSP primitive numbers; the Pete core
only uses 1 16x16 multiplier to implement all of its ISA extensions. As the level of
hardware acceleration increases, the DSP numbers scale accordingly. The FFAU
core within the Monte accelerator synthesizes into 4 and 16 primitives in pipelined
32x32 and 64x64 configurations.

Primitive

Table 7.5: Hardware Resource Usage
PeteISE PeteMonte32 PeteMonte64
PeteMonte64
Zynq 7Z020

LUTs
FFs
BRAM36
BRAM18
DSP

4685
2944
33
1
1

Kintex 7K325T

5403
3426
43
3
5

6074
3700
47
1
17

38

6603
3802
46
0
17

Chapter 8
Conclusion

We analyzed the new class of SI algorithms on a deeply-embedded processor and
compared it to 32- and 64-bit x86 implementations representative of a desktop
processor. After first compiling a constant-time portable C version of the opensource SI library, our results showed that a single key generation took over a billion
cycles on Pete over all the primes analyzed. By modifying the finite-field and multiprecision routines to use the ISEs, we saw an improvement of 6.3-7.5x compared
to the portable C implementation. With the addition of Monte32, results showed
a 38.7-45.3x speedup over the portable C implementation. After upgrading to
Monte64, the performance improved another 2.65-2.95x over using Monte32. Each
of these improvements maintained constant-time algorithms. Monte64 showed
better performance than an optimized 64-bit x86 implementation on a cycle-bycycle basis.
Our design is unique in that Monte is small and completely reconfigurable in
software. That is, it can be tailored for each prime extension field at initialization
time and does not require resynthesis. This contrasts the SIDH and SIKE accelerators that others developed [17, 12], which are capable of achieving speed records
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at the cost of a large area and inflexibility of design.
The ISEs and Monte were originally designed to optimize traditional ECC.
Though we made some modifications to the design of Monte, we showed the performance improvements the original ECC optimizations had on the SI algorithms.
We believe current ECC implementations could be redesigned to use the quantum
secure SI algorithms and still leverage existing optimizations.

8.1

Future Work

The extension of prior work using Pete and Monte from traditional ECC algorithms to SI algorithms was natural considering the similarity of the underlying
mathematics. However, most constructions submitted to the NIST PQC project
are not based on SI or ECC. As such, we should study the application of the existing architectures to other proposed algorithms. Additionally, we should study
whether modifications to or new instructions and accelerators can help make PQC
algorithms practical in the embedded domain.
Given the substantial performance increase observed in scaling the Monte datapath from 32 to 64 bits, it would be interesting to explore how a similar scaling
of the Pete multiplication/accumulator logic would affect performance. As noted
earlier, Monte does not take advantage of the form of the primes for the SI algorithms. Modification of microcode to take advantage of the reduced computation
allowed by the primes might be possible and should be explored.
As attacks and security estimates are refined, it is likely that the proposed
primes and fields defining specific security levels will change. Because the Pete
and Monte architectures are designed with agnosticism to the prime values, we
should keep up to date with the latest proposed values, such as faster, smaller
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primes less than p503 or larger, more secure primes greater than p964.
In addition to SIDH and SIKE, other SI-based cryptosystems have been proposed, such as SI variants of the Digital Signature Algorithm [14, 27, 12]. Because
these algorithms are based on the same mathematics, we believe that the ISEs and
coprocessor optimizations can be applied to them in a similar manner. Exploring
the performance of these algorithms in an embedded system context should prove
interesting.
Finally, we’d like to gather energy and power measurements of SI algorithms.
Many embedded applications are energy- and power-limited and we’d like to marry
the fields of post-quantum security with ultra-low energy computing. The existing
instructions and coprocessor architecture were shown to be efficient across the
range of existing ECC security levels [29] (NIST p192 - p521 [22]), but we have not
yet explored how energy scales with SI prime sizes or how the trades of datapath
size vs power and energy apply to acceleration of SI algorithms.
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Op

x86

Table A.1: Field Math Cycle Count
x64
Pete
PeteISE PM32

PM64

p503
Fp Add
Fp Sub
Fp Mul
Fp Sqr
Fp Red
Fp Inv
Fp2 Add
Fp2 Sub
Fp2 Mul
Fp2 Sqr
Fp2 Inv

415
258
11,963
†
5,055
6,431k
719
445
28,163
21,534
6,457k

51
47
390
†
165
229,513
90
77
1,041
841
206,928

955
663
34,361
†
13,845
20,944k
1,902
1,318
90,347
69,928
21,082k

648
445
5,161
4,677
2,670
2,908k
1,296
893
13,076
11,187
2,928k

55
55
666
†
2,696
417,670
110
110
2,369
1,568
420,565

31
31
210
†
2,696
134,582
62
62
857
568
125,565

†
1,867
1,256
103
†
1,287
861
103
†
133,125
16,816
2,347
†
†
14,862
†
†
53,249
8,794
8,820
†
232,926k 27,431k 4,410k
†
3,726
2,513
206
†
2,566
1,725
206
†
348,400
43,071
7,697
†
268,643
35,298
5,104
†
233,461k 27,496k 4,150k
k Clock cycles in thousands
* Algorithm does not employ loop-unrolling
† Optimized implementation unavailable

55
55
666
†
8,822
1,183k
110
110
2,369
1,568
1,186k

p964
Fp Add
Fp Sub
Fp Mul
Fp Sqr
Fp Red
Fp Inv*
Fp2 Add
Fp2 Sub
Fp2 Mul
Fp2 Sqr
Fp2 Inv*

792
524
41,135
†
16,732
71,852k
1,582
1,047
108,719
83,087
72,033k

43

Appendix A. Supporting Data

Op

Table A.2: EC Operation Cycle Count
x86
x64
Pete
PeteISE PM32

PM64

157,895
309,550
130,564
157,762
89,362
215,282

13,041
25,479
11,115
13,048
6,824
17,986

4,817
9,463
4,403
4,816
2,600
6,642

41,777
81,319
33,755
41,800
21,416
57,570

13,041
25,479
11,115
13,048
6,824
17,986

p503
2P
3P
get3isog(P )
eval3isog(P )
get4isog(P )
eval4isog(P )

5,385
10,613
5,020
5,356
3,256
7,290

507,458
996,409
416,680
507,441
288,430
691,240

79,085
157,612
77,963
79,068
50,853
107,408

p964
2P
3P
get3isog(P )
eval3isog(P )
get4isog(P )
eval4isog(P )

Op

607,931
1,188,971
489,670
607,640
340,409
826,787
† Optimized

†
1,943,241 251,371
†
3,810,556 497,593
†
1,554,552 227,366
†
1,943,228 251,362
†
1,091,817 152,981
†
2,646,206 341,737
implementation unavailable

Table A.3: SIDH Cycle Count - cc * 103
x86
x64
Pete
PeteISE

PM32

PM64

33,433
36,753
27,114
30,952

12,534
13,848
10,181
11,686

224,892
239,759
187,088
206,177

70,923
75,866
59,004
65,271

p503
A Public Key
B Public Key
A Shared Key
B Shared Key

404,077
454,014
328,001
373,884

15,141
15,394
11,335
13,001

1,290,674
1,422,263
1,052,815
1,201,573

201,914
225,263
164,620
190,536

p964
A Public Key
B Public Key
A Shared Key
B Shared Key

3,233,546
†
10,425,433 1,350,260
3,463,766
†
11,168,205 1,457,806
2,707,163
†
8,730,791 1,128,804
2,990,773
†
9,647,917 1,258,500
† Optimized implementation unavailable
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Op

Table A.4: SIKE Cycle Count - cc * 103
x86
x64
Pete
PeteISE
PM32

PM64

p503
Public Key
Encapsulate
Decapsulate

442,746
730,149
775,677

16,533
24,969
26,616

1,422,268
2,343,805
2,492,566

225,279
366,866
392,787

36,758
60,861
64,703

13,853
23,028
24,536

1,457,807 239,767
2,479,541 412,467
2,609,239 431,559
unavailable

75,875
130,413
136,687

p964
Public Key
Encapsulate
Decapsulate

3,472,063
†
11,168,214
5,961,490
†
19,156,714
6,269,328
†
20,073,841
† Optimized implementation

45

Appendix B
Supporting Algorithms

46

Appendix B. Supporting Algorithms

Algorithm 9 Multi-precision Squaring
procedure MpSqr(a,c,n)
. c = a2 , where n is the array length in words.
. Initialize the accumulator.
ACC ← a20
c0 ← ACCLO
. Move data out of accumulator into c.
Shift ACC
. Using the sha instruction.
for k in 1 to n − 1 do
. Lower words of result.
i←0
j←k
while i < j do
ACC ← ACC + 2aj ai−j
. Using the m2addu instruction.
i←i+1
j ←j−1
end while
if i = j then
ACC ← ACC + a2i
end if
ck ← ACCLO
Shift ACC
end for
for k in n to 2n − 2 do
. Upper words of result.
i ← k − (n − 1)
j ←n−1
while i < j do
ACC ← ACC + 2aj ai−j
i←i+1
j ←j−1
end while
if i = j then
ACC ← ACC + a2i
end if
ck ← ACCLO
Shift ACC
end for
ACC ← ACC + a2i
c2n−1 ← ACCLO
. Most significant word.
end procedure
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